Intersubjectivity in the imagination and feelings of the infant : implications for education in the early years by Trevarthen, Colwyn & Delafield-Butt, Jonathan
Strathprints Institutional Repository
Trevarthen, Colwyn and Delafield-Butt, Jonathan (2016) Intersubjectivity 
in the imagination and feelings of the infant : implications for education 
in the early years. In: Under-three Year Olds in Policy and Practice. 
Policy and Pedagogy with Under-three Year Olds: Cross-disciplinary 
Insights and Innovations . Springer. ISBN 9789811022746 (In Press) , 
This version is available at http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/57004/
Strathprints is  designed  to  allow  users  to  access  the  research  output  of  the  University  of 
Strathclyde. Unless otherwise explicitly stated on the manuscript, Copyright © and Moral Rights 
for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. 
Please check the manuscript for details of any other licences that may have been applied. You 
may  not  engage  in  further  distribution  of  the  material  for  any  profitmaking  activities  or  any 
commercial gain. You may freely distribute both the url (http://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/) and the 
content of this paper for research or private study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes without 
prior permission or charge. 
Any  correspondence  concerning  this  service  should  be  sent  to  Strathprints  administrator: 
strathprints@strath.ac.uk
 - 1 - 
Intersubjectivity in the Imagination and Feelings of the Infant:  
Implications for Education in the Early Years 
 
Colwyn Trevarthen and Jonathan T. Delafield-Butt 
 
 
AUTHOR ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 
 
Trevarthen, C., & Delafield-Butt, J. T. (2017). Intersubjectivity in the imagination and feelings of the 
infant: Implications for education in the early years. In E. J. White & C. Dalli (Eds.), Under-
three year olds in policy and practice. New York: Springer 
 
http://www.springer.com/us/book/9789811022746 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This chapter presents the child as a creature born with the spirit of an inquisitive 
and creative human being, seeking understanding of what to do with body and mind 
in a world of invented possibilities. He or she is intuitively sociable, seeking 
affectionate relations with companions who are willing to share the pleasure and 
adventure of doing and knowing with 'human sense'. Recent research traces signs of 
the child's impulses and feelings from before birth, and follows their efforts to 
master experience through stages of self-creating in enjoyable and hopeful 
companionship. Sensitive timing of rhythms in action and playful invention show 
age-related advances of creative vitality as the body and brain grow. Much of 
shared meaning is understood and played with before a child can benefit from 
school instruction in a prescribed curriculum of the proper ways to use elaborate 
symbolic conventions. We begin with the theory of James Mark Baldwin, who 
observed that infants and young children are instinctive experimenters, repeating 
experience by imitating their own as well as other's actions, accommodating to the 
resources of the shared world and assimilating new experiences as learned ideas for 
action. We argue that the child's contribution to cultural learning is a good guide for 
practice in early education and care of children in their families and communities 
and in artificially planned and technically structured modern worlds of bewildering 
diversity 
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Intersubjectivity in the Imagination and Feelings of the Infant:  
Implications for Education in the Early Years 
 
 ÒIn the last 50 years, theory about how the mind of the child grows with the body 
and develops intelligence has changed. Psychobiological research has revealed that 
infants move with rhythms of prospective awareness from birth, show insight for 
learning what the world affords, and share their feelings of imaginative vitality in 
affectionate adventures with other persons.Ó (Trevarthen and Bj¿rkvold, 2016) 
 
In this chapter, with different experiences in the exploration of the movements of infants 
(Trevarthen, 1979, 1992, 2001; Delafield-Butt and Gangopadhyay, 2013), we use detailed 
evidence from recordings of how happy infants communicate to develop the idea that a child 
learns by being full of hopeful emotion and the will to live with loved parents and lively 
brothers and sisters (Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2013; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 
2013). The behaviour of a young human being is not just for attracting protection and care, and 
not only cognitive or rational for learning about objective facts. It is adapted to come to life in, 
intimate and playful companionship, or Ôintersubjective awarenessÕ. Experienced teachers 
know, as loving parents do, that human life begins with an eagerness to share meaning in the 
pleasure of activity with friends. 
Leaders of modern child psychology have seen that young children learn, not passively, but by 
active, intentional engagement of their bodies to see hear and touch objects that catch their 
interest. With James Mark Baldwin (1895), Jean Piaget (1953) and Lev Vygotsky (Vygotsky, 
1978), we accept that knowledge is gained by moving with curiosity. New evidence shows that 
even newborn infants move to share their interest in objects and events with persons they know 
well in an intimate sympathy of actions. Their innocent bodies and minds require both self-
sustaining, regulation of inner vitality for well-being, and imaginative control of movement by 
perception of the outside world for the successful completion of tasks, and they enjoy showing 
and sharing of intentions with other persons. From the beginning, conscious interaction with 
the world is a living process, not only a collection and retention of facts to be learned, but a 
story of experience to be created, and it seeks companionship in the pleasure of discovery.  
Knowledge is gained through Ôparticipatory sense-makingÕ, with social others (De Jaeger and 
Di Paolo, 2007; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013; Reddy, 2008, 2015). A search for 
understanding of this vital inter-mental learning is leading infant pedagogy today to a re-
appreciation of the childÕs contribution to transmission of knowledge and skills (Trevarthen, 
Gratier and Osborne, 2014; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2015). 
Of course, a newborn infant has limited powers of action and mobility. A one-year-old cannot 
walk or talk, and they know little about the outside world. But this physical weakness and 
inexperience, which needs for a long period of parental care, does not prevent the baby from 
attending intelligently to people and what they are doing. The baby moves to join in actions of 
a helper who is picking up and carrying them (Fantasia et al., 2016), or one who is offering 
objects with admiration for the babyÕs actions, and for the mind that guides them. In a few 
weeks the baby is starting to use vocal sounds as signs for marking special experiences in a 
Ôline modeÕ of consciousness that can be about non-present things or happenings Ôsomeplace, 
sometimeÕ (Donaldson, 1992, p. 50).  A lively mind is eager to share remembered meanings 
with others in imagination for moving. Narratives or stories are being created to represent 
projects of Ôserially ordered actionsÕ that become a Ôcommon senseÕ world (Bruner, 1990, 2003; 
Donaldson, 1992; Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013; Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2015).  
Thinking about actions through time is what Karl Lashley (1951) identified as the foundation 
for the grammar of language before Chomsky (1965) presented his cognitive theory of a 
separate instinct for grammar. Lashley added the remarkable suggestion that, Òanalysis of the 
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nervous mechanisms underlying order in the more primitive acts may contribute ultimately to 
the solution even of the physiology of logicÓ (p. 121).  Our special human abilities for 
accumulating complex skills for inventing institutions, making buildings and machines, 
celebrating the arts and recording and thinking about our culture in language, have their origins 
in what a young baby can do in the rhythm of playful movements with someone they love 
(Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2015). 
A nine-month old is combining gestures and vocalizations in non-verbal messages of a 
ÔprotolanguageÕ, which parents easily understand to mean ideas like ÒIsnÕt that interestingÓ, ÒI 
want that oneÓ, ÒWhat a terrible noiseÓ, ÒGo away from meÓ. (Halliday, 1975).  Acts of 
ÔlanguagingÕ are made well before the child can Ôtalk properlyÕ (Bruner, 1977; Donaldson, 
1978; Maturana, Mpodozis and Letelier, 1995).  We explore these Ôacts of meaningÕ, presenting 
our research and that of others to illustrate the richness of play of infants with their mothers, 
fathers or other intimate companions. And we consider their significance for the development 
of self-confident knowledge and skills of both children and teachers in Early Childhood 
Education and Care (ECEC) settings today. 
 
Story-Telling from Birth: Making Sense of Experience In Non-Verbal Narrative  
As we have been taught by the founder of a rich educational psychology, Jerome Bruner, who 
died in June 2016 at the age of 100, we are born Ôstory-telling creaturesÕ (Bruner, 2003). All 
our narratives, whatever they are ÔaboutÕ, are motor performances with serial organization 
through episodes of vitality (Stern, 2010). We explore space and time in active experience, and 
build social understanding by sharing feelings and intentions in movement (Delafield-Butt and 
Trevarthen, 2015). Narrative behaviour, Òinherent in the praxis of social interaction [even] 
before it achieves linguistic expressionÓ (Bruner, 1990, p. 77) is a foundation of conversational 
meaning-making and culture (Read and Miller, 1995; Cobley, 2014). In our stories we make 
sense of our experiences, evaluate our actions and understand our intentions with aesthetic and 
moral feelings about how they are performed (Kearney, 2002; Cunliffe and Coupland, 2012).  
The creation of sequences of expressive behaviour - with the phases of ÔintroductionÕ, 
ÔdevelopmentÕ, ÔclimaxÕ and ÔresolutionÕ enjoyed in the proto-conversations, action games and 
baby songs with infants - represent the Ôcommunicative musicalityÕ of relationships (Gratier 
and Trevarthen, 2008; Gratier and Apter-Danon, 2009; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009). As 
psychiatrist Daniel Stern taught us, ideas are expressed as Ôproto-narrative envelopesÕ and 
Ôschemas of being-withÕ in communication between a mother and infant (Stern 1995), and with 
universal human Ôvitality dynamicsÕ (Stern, 2010). The emotions of these simple human stories 
inspire reflections with an artful sense of beauty (Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2013; 
Trevarthen and Malloch, 2016).  
Study of the initiatives of infants for learning in playful ways has important implications for a 
responsive pedagogy that aims to guide a child to a productive and self-confident adult life in 
family and community.  New evidence from research on animal emotions for social 
cooperation confirms that a human life follows a creative imaginative path based on feelings 
shared as emotional intelligence or Ôaffective consciousnessÕ. which directs collaborative action 
to make a new and valued reality for the Ôcognitive consciousnessÕ of a community (Panksepp 
and Biven, 2012).  In concert with sociocultural theories (Vygotsky, 1978, Rogoff, 2003) we 
consider that such advances cannot be comprehended without consideration of their location 
within particular cultural practices and values (Negayama et al., 2015). The foundation for our 
knowledge is in our innate feelings for collaborative awareness in the experience of action 
(Delafield-Butt and Trevarthen, 2015). 
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Philosophy of Meaning: A Phenomenological Approach to a Brain Science of Infant 
Intersubjectivity and Its Motor Intelligence 
The power of the brain to integrate its activities prospectively in coherent rhythmic patterns of 
moving is recognised in the philosophy of phenomenology, which admits that it is movements 
of the body that create and respond to consciousness by acting with the brain-generated 
ÔsubjectiveÕ time of intentional doing and thinking (Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Goodrich, 2010).  
The pioneer of modern self-sensing neuroscience and discoverer of the Integrative Action of the 
Nervous System, Charles Sherrington, said, when summarizing his scientific philosophy at the 
age of 80, that the development of any individual person cannot be an act of ÔmemoryÕ, since 
each life is a new phenomenon - it must be considered an act of ÔimaginationÕ (Sherrington, 
1955, Chapter 4, ÒThe Wisdom of the BodyÓ, pp. 103-104). Indeed, all animal movement must 
anticipate consequences that affect continuation of life, which requires an imagined awareness 
of the environment to be encountered, including other intentional beings. 
This awareness of life in action becomes appraised and evaluated from the beginning of life, 
giving rise to Jaak PankseppÕs Ôaffective intelligenceÕ generated by core brainstem systems 
(Panksepp, 2005; Porges and Furman, 2011).  We now recognize that basic perceptual and 
affective experience is generated, not by habits learned in the cerebral cortices, but by the 
impulses of the brainstem, forming a primary conscious intelligence from which abstract and 
reflective intelligence in later childhood and adulthood develops (Northoff and Panksepp, 2008; 
Panksepp and Northoff, 2009).  Feelings in communities of animal beings shape the evolution 
and development of acquired knowledge and skills (Packard and Delafield-Butt, 2014). 
The core, primary Self of a human infant moves to explore the world and learns the 
contingencies of action, but it is limited in scope and power (Delafield-Butt and 
Gangopadhyay, 2013).  Human consciousness of shared meaning develops in sophistication 
and power as the cortex matures, in a childhood of affective, embodied experiences in 
sympathetic company (Vandekerckhove and Panksepp, 2011).  Simple actions performed in 
utero and the first gestures in early life, tested in communication with a caring and sensitive 
caregiver, are brought together, or ÔchainedÕ, to compose habits or projects of action that may 
reach far into the future (Pezzulo and Castelfranchi, 2009).  
We have to grasp the idea of a fundamental Ômotor intelligenceÕ for acting with awareness if we 
are to understand how consciousness develops with increasing efficiency. In the 1920s a young 
Russian neurophysiologist, Nikolai Bernstein (1967), used frame-by-frame examination of film 
taken at 40 frames per second to trace the regulation of forces in the moving body of a tool-
user, a runner, or a child learning to walk. He proved that the vast array of motor components 
involved in any body action are assembled in advance by a motor image formed in the brain. 
The intended movement so conceived is highly efficient, wasting almost no energy. 
Furthermore, well-done movements are always rhythmic, smoothing out the irregular inertial 
forces they master through planned steps of time. David Lee (2005) has employed accurate 
mathematical analysis of how movements of an animal are guided precisely to reach a goal, and 
shown that there has evolved a special formulation for this control, which he calls a ÔtauÕ 
function.  It is common to a wide range of animal brains, and appears to be a biological 
universal (Delafield-Butt and Schgler, 2007; Delafield-Butt et al., 2012). Even the sucking 
movements of a newborn baby obey this basic principle of prospective control (Craig and Lee, 
1999). Moving rhythmically in time also enables synchronization between individual actors in 
a dance of life that composes meaningful projects of cooperation. 
There have been advances in applying such thinking about the time of movements in the 
mind to explain the inter-subjectivity of communication (Thelin, 2014). In The Laws of 
Emotion, Frijda (2007) reviews what is known about the importance of the timing of 
emotional expressions, and of regulating their intensity and duration in immediate intimate 
encounters between persons. The topic of Vitality Dynamics, richly explored by 
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psychiatrist Daniel Stern (2010), explains how a life time of ÔaffectiveÕ states of the self is 
made apparent in ÔaffectingÕ signals to others, with subtle regulations of ÔarousalÕ in the 
vigor of actions. This is how affective signals communicate experience in Ôthe present 
momentÕ of life together (Stern 2004).  
Like Goodrich, Stern (2010) perceives the advantages of a phenomenology which, he says: 
provides an account of the subjective world experienced as it is lived, pre-
theoretically, pre-reflectively. The subjective, phenomenal world is as whatever is 
passing across the Òmental stageÕÕ, right now. It does not concern itself with how the 
scene got on the mental stage, nor why it got there, nor when, nor whether it is ÒrealÓ 
in any objective sense. This current of philosophy É provides a starting place to look 
for vitality dynamics or the feel of being alive. William James (1890), Edmond 
Husserl (1964), and Merleau-Ponty (1962) are the most influential thinkers for this 
present work. (p. 34) 
Sharing the same inborn sense of time, we develop conventional doing and thinking, or 
meaning-making (Trevarthen, 2015). 
 
 
Genesis of Conventional Meaning Learned In Shared Experience 
 
Communication of Interests and Feelings in Proto-Conversational Narratives at Two Months: 
Educating Motherese 
Early in the 1970s researchers working independently in Boston and New York to trace the 
development of motor activities aimed at objects and people reported evidence that the infants 
had elaborate motives for sharing interests, purposes and feelings. 
An anthropologist and linguist Mary Catherine Bateson, who had studied universal gestural 
principles of human communication described by Ray Birdwhistle (1970), worked with 
Margaret Bullowa to understand the early acquisition of speech production and perception in 
the Speech and Communication Group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Bullowa, 
1979).  Bateson, while expecting the birth of her daughter, made a detailed description of films 
of an infant 7 to 14 weeks of age in spontaneous interactions with the mother, as follows: 
ÒÉ the mother and infant were collaborating in a pattern of more or less alternating, non-
overlapping vocalization, the mother speaking brief sentences and the infant responding 
with coos and murmurs, together producing a brief joint performance similar to 
conversation, which I called 'proto conversation'. É These interactions were 
characterized by a sort of delighted, ritualized courtesy and more or less sustained 
attention and mutual gaze. Many of the vocalizations were of types not described in the 
acoustic literature on infancy, since they were very brief and faint, and yet were crucial 
parts of the jointly sustained performances.Ó (Bateson, 1979, p. 65, emphasis added).  
Bateson was convinced that the infant was participating in mutual consciousness with a subtle 
grammar of movements to communicate, neither of which requires the symbolic conventions of 
language. 
In New York, Daniel Stern, also inspired by BirdwhistellÕs ÔkinesicsÕ, found that three-and-a- 
half-month-old twins were actively guiding their mother in playful exchanges by precise 
engagement of expressive movements (Stern, 1971). This work led Stern away from 
conventional ideas of child psychiatry and psychoanalysis to path-finding studies of The 
Interpersonal World of the Infant (Stern, 2000), and to elucidation of the dynamic principles of 
Forms of Vitality in body movement (Stern, 2010). 
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In 1968 Jerome Bruner, who had introduced in preceding decades a philosophy of education 
that recognized the initiative of the child for learning, and the importance of Ôvalue and needÕ 
for perceiving meaning, reported on a transformation of the work of the Center for Cognitive 
Studies at Harvard to focus on infant intelligence and learning, with inspiration from 
ethological work on non-human primates. He set up, with the support of the pediatrician T. 
Berry Brazelton, a richly equipped research facility for use of a variety of recording devices 
and high-speed film to observe motor patterns and selective attention in young infants. 
Discoveries were made by visiting researchers and doctoral students, including Hanuš 
Papoušek and Tom Bower, that brought to light very early awareness of objects in body-related 
space and well-timed and directed actions to make sensory contact with them (Bruner, 1968).  
With BrazeltonÕs advice and Martin Richards, a zoologist interested in maternal behaviour of 
mammals, a private film studio was set up to record natural spontaneous communication 
between infant two- to three-months-olds and their mothers, and to observe actions that the 
infants directed to objects (Bruner, 1968). Using a single camera, the behaviours of the infant 
were observed from directly in front, and the motherÕs behaviours were recorded from a large 
front-surface mirror placed beside the infant (Trevarthen, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1979). Two 
important findings were clearly established.  
First, the behaviours that infants addressed to objects and those they aimed at their motherÕs 
attention were different. We called them ÔdoingÕ with things, and ÔcommunicatingÕ with a 
person. Secondly, in the communications that were supported by the motherÕs affectionate 
interest the babies took the initiative. For most of their ÔconversationsÕ the mothers were 
imitating the infantÕs expressions of vitality and their emotions of pleasure, displeasure, interest 
or disinterest. Rarely did the infant imitate the mother. (Figure 2.1) 
 
 
Figure 2.1: 
ÒPhotographic samples show how a mother may adopt postures and expressions to 
closely mirror what her baby does. The intense mutuality or harmony of the 
behaviour comes initially from the infant responding to the motherÕs friendly 
behaviour in kind. Then the development is principally due to the mother accepting 
the expressions of the infant as models for her expression, or, rather, as indicative 
of an emotion which she may both share with her infant and express in like 
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manner.Ó (Trevarthen, 1977, p. 241).  
From a film made at the Center for Cognitive Studies, Harvard, in 1968. The infant 
is three months old. These pictures were first published in Trevarthen, 1974 
 
None of the three above studies used psychological testing according to an experimental 
protocol. All relied on detailed recordings that were studied later to measure their rhythms and 
intentional or affective forms.  
In his summary of the work at Harvard, Bruner emphasized that,  
ÒAs the joint efforts within the Center have turned more toward infancy, there has 
occurred a gradual change toward the viewpoint of a naturalist exploring a new 
species, and away from an exclusive emphasis on the testing of specific 
hypotheses derived from a general theory of infant development. The objective of 
the research is much as it has been in the past: to elucidate the processes by which 
human beings achieve, retain, transform and communicate information.Ó  
(Bruner, 1968, p. ii).  
In that study and in further work with infants of the same age in Edinburgh, both the subjective 
self-regulations of the infant, and the inter-subjective patterns that sustained the Ôdialogues of 
movementÕ were recorded in photographs and drawings traced from films. They supported the 
theory that the young infant has strong abilities for sharing a primary intersubjective awareness 
with an attentive adult, and special actions of hand gesture, facial expression and ÔprespeechÕ 
movements of tongue and lips were demonstrated (Trevarthen, 1974, 1977, 1979). In her work 
Bateson (1971) used refined acoustic analysis of illustrative examples of vocal engagement to 
represent this dialogic motivation. 
 
Exchanges in Dialogues of Imitation With Newborns 
After the revelations from film studies of communication with infants after the second month, 
proving their conversational abilities, detailed analysis of voluntary engagements of babies 
from the first hours after birth confirmed the innate foundations of the mutual awareness. Until 
then, the firmly held belief of doctors, psychologists and educators was that a newborn cannot 
imitate expressive movements. This was the view of Sigmund Freud and Jean Piaget. Disproof 
of this theory was anticipated by Henri Wallon in the 1940s, then clearly demonstrated by Olga 
Maratos in 1973 when she reported the findings of her PhD research to Piaget at the University 
of Geneva. Piaget conceded Òindeed they imitateÕ, but kept reservations about what it signified 
for their state of awareness. Despite intense controversy, with ardent defense of the learning 
theory, clear evidence accumulated that alert infants were ready immediately after birth to 
imitate a wide range of movements of another personÕs head, eyes, mouth, vocal sounds and 
hand gestures (Nagy, 2011; Kugiumutzakis and Trevarthen, 2015).  
An important additional discovery was that the imitating infants wanted to participate in a 
reciprocal exchange, in a confirmation of mutual awareness. Emese Nagy changed the 
interpretation that the imitations were an automatic ÔmirroringÕ by showing that a newborn 
could repeat an imitated act as a ÔprovocationÕ to invite a reciprocal imitation by the adult. The 
baby was accepting the expressive movement as an invitation to a creative dialogue of signs, or 
the affirmation of a convention of communication as an Ôact of meaningÕ (Nagy and Molnr, 
2004; Nagy, 2008).  
Kugiumutzakis, in 1983, had recorded how an infant girl, filmed with him at 20 minutes after 
her birth, participated in a cooperative exchange of mouth opening movements, shifting 
attention from his mouth when attending to his gesture, to his eyes when watching for his 
response. (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: 
A cycle of imitations of Mouth Opening with a female infant 20 minutes after birth. 
Recorded a maternity hospital in Herakleion, Crete in 1983 by Giannis 
Kugiumutzakis for his PhD research at the University of Uppsala.  
A     0 sec. GK presents a wide open mouth for the first time to the attentive 
infant, I, who is focusing on his mouth, and with slightly closed eyes 
and pursed mouth.  
B   6.3 sec.  GK opens his mouth for the fourth time. I continues to observe his 
mouth with evident interest. The right hand moves up. 
C   7.1 sec.  GK opens his mouth for the fifth time. I imitates him once, 
synchronously while watching his mouth. The right hand closes. 
D   8.9 sec.  I imitates a second time, looking up at the researcherÕs eyes as he 
waits. 
E  10.7 sec.  Both pause, waiting. The infant is still looking at his eyes. 
F  11.3 sec.  I makes a third large imitation while looking at the researcherÕs mouth, 
looking for a response. 
GK = Giannis Kugiumutzakis.  I = Infant 
 
 
Nagy (2011) recorded a more rapid exchange of finger movements with a newborn infant 
which similarly demonstrates the two phases of the infantÕs interest, observing the proffered 
expressive movement, an index finger extension and imitating, then watching for and accepting 
a return imitation. (Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3: 
A short exchange of intentions with interest recorded by Emese Nagy, of a sign she 
offered to the infant by extending the index finger of one hand, which the infant 
first imitates, then seeks an imitative response from the adult elicited by what Nagy 
described as an act of ÔprovocationÕ. 
A  0 sec. The infant is watching her own hand move 
B  2 sec. Emese Nagy holds up her left hand with index finger extended.  
The infant looks at the hand. 
C  4 sec. EmeseÕs hand is lowered, and the infant waits, looking at it. 
D  10 sec. After a long pause the infant suddenly raises her right hand and 
watches as she makes an extension of the index finger. 
E  12 sec. The infant looks back to Emese with her hand up and the finger 
extended, mouth open, as if questioning. 
F  15 sec. Emese responds with an index finger extension, and the infant 
watches intently with an ÔattentiveÕ mouth 
 
 
 
 
 - 10 - 
 
Development of Narrative Rituals In Play, and Playful Sharing of Objects in Unexpected Ways. 
After the discovery of proto-conversational exchanges of the early months, in which the infant 
took a leading role, study of how individual baby-mother pairs changed their behaviour through 
the first year brought to light Ôage-related changesÕ in the infantsÕ interests and actions, which 
led the mother to adopt different strategies to share interests, feelings and actions (Trevarthen, 
1988, 1992, 2001). Infants develop their abilities through measures of time with new powers of 
movement with awareness.  
A rich record of these motivated changes, which are found to be similar in babies who are 
growing up in all kinds of family and culture, is presented with hundreds of beautifully 
presented photographs in Lynne MurrayÕs book The Psychology of Babies (Murray, 2014). We 
have related the key changes to developments in the human brain that regulate both movements 
and perception, and changes in feelings and their emotional expression (Trevarthen and Aitken, 
2003). In the second edition of The Interpersonal World of the Infant (Stern, 2000) Daniel 
Stern presents a lucid overview of how innate motivations of infants are retained as a 
foundation for the later stages. 
With advances in their visual awareness after 3 months, and as support of the head, tracking 
movements of the eyes and control of arm and hand extensions develop, babies become more 
curious about their surroundings. They make efforts to examine nearby objects and look out to 
more distant places. In response, their mothers become more playfully seductive, to draw their 
attention. This generates what we called the Period of Games, first by exchanging expressions 
of curiosity and joy with teasing, or Person-Person games, then after 6 months Person-Person-
Object games with ÔtoysÕ as the infants become more determined to explore anything they 
might get their hands on, enjoying the sights and sounds of actions with attractive things 
(Trevarthen, 1977; Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978). 
Vasudevi Reddy has given attention to the use of Ôjoking, teasing and mucking aboutÕ to bring 
joy to these engagements of play, and she has charted the parallel development of self-
consciousness or awareness of the Self in the appreciation of an Other (Reddy, 2003, 2005, 
2008; Reddy and Trevarthen, 2004). This may be described as a maturation of two kinds of 
feeling for experiences, an ÔaestheticÕ appreciation of what may be done by engagement with 
ÔthingsÕ, and a ÔmoralÕ engagement with the feelings of a ÔpersonÕ as partner in communication 
(Trevarthen and Reddy, 2016).  
The changes in the infantsÕ motives and their communication with affectionate company reflect 
transformations of the Ôvitality dynamicsÕ elucidated by Daniel Stern (Stern, 2010), who 
demonstrates that each phase in the development of increasingly elaborate expressions of Ôhow 
to moveÕ acts as a foundation that persists through the later attainments. 
These transformations of the young human being, affecting their exploration of the material 
world and their relationships with companions and hence their learning of meaning for life in a 
particular family and community are an essential part of human nature, adapted, from infancy, 
for education in the ways of a community with its culture (Trevarthen and Delafield-Butt, 2013, 
2015).  
 
Sympathetic Rhythms of Communicative Musicality In Proto-Conversations, Action Games and 
Nursery Songs 
From the beginning, the new descriptive research of the natural spontaneous actions of infants 
has drawn researchersÕ attention to the timing, especially the infantÕs creation and coordination 
of rhythms in all kinds of movement -- looking with head and eyes, reaching out to point to or 
grasp objects, making vocalisations and gestures that express feelings, and their sensitivity for 
the rhythms of other personsÕ actions and especially the vocal sounds they make in speech or 
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song. This discovery has been supported by research on the prospective control of all animal 
movements, including the unique human powers of bipedal locomotion, the manipulation of 
objects as tools or toys, and the elaboration of narratives by creative patterns of voice and 
gesture (Bernstein, 1967; Lee, 2005).  
Scientific research on the rhythms of life and their sharing in early childhood has benefitted 
greatly from the use of musical acoustics (Malloch, 1999) to reveal fine details of motor 
expression and their regulation by an Intrinsic Motive Pulse  (IMP). ÒMusicality in human 
motives, the psycho-biological source of music, is described as a talent inherent in the unique 
way human beings move, and hence experience their world, their bodies and one another.Ó 
(Trevarthen, 1999, p. 155). 
 
With Stephen Malloch, we have studied the rhythms of action games with infants and baby 
songs in many different cultures and found universal principles of timing, expression and 
narrative form (Malloch, 1999; Malloch and Trevarthen, 2009). The infants are not compliant 
imitators in these celebrations of joy in relationships with familiar people, they are active and 
stimulating performers. One amazing film shows how a 5-month-old baby born totally blind 
conducts with her left hand her Swedish motherÕs singing of a baby song that is known all over 
Scandanivia. The baby moves with the delicate gestures of a professional conductor, and 
anticipates important moments in the drama by a fraction of a second, moving just before her 
motherÕs note changes. She describes the melody with the feelings of her body (Trevarthen, 
1999, p. 185). 
Dancing celebrations and songs are attractive to infants as their bodies gain strength in the 
middle of the first year and key components like the pulse and rhyming vowels are learned and 
repeated. They are becoming ways of sharing rituals of unspoken common sense, leading to the 
special traditional ways of a particular culture (Brten and Trevarthen, 2007). The baby is 
beginning to make sounds that have the recognisable ÔaccentÕ of speech in their family. This is 
the time when they show they have a disposition to master a language. 
  
Secondary Intersubjectivity Leading to Speech 
Language is ÔaboutÕ actions, events, and desirable or interesting objects in a shared world, 
which by use of symbolic representation, does not have to be present. Speech is the key that 
opens the door to a great expansion of the world which becomes known with good companions, 
first in remembered times and places, then in an ideal world of meanings anywhere or anytime 
(Donaldson, 1992, on Ômodes of mindÕ). Studies of communication before proto-language have 
discovered an important step in the infantÕs awareness of other personÕs purposes and interests 
at 9 months, a transformation in the initiative of the child for learning, one which changes the 
way adults behave as teacher-companions.  
Penelope Hubley documented development of one infant girl through her first year by 
comparing film showing how she shared the fun of games with her motherÕs expressions of 
intentions and feelings, for example in the sharing of rhythms and melodies in action games 
and baby songs like ÒRock-a-bye babyÓ,  ÒRound and round the gardenÓ and ÒClappa-clappa-
handiesÓ.  Hubley found that the infantÕs interest in sharing of objects as toys in play also 
changed, and that this affected the way the mother communicated with her: 
 In the development of fundamental human skills, a regulated pattern of change is clear in 
the first year of life. A large step towards confidence in "self' and confiding in others is 
expressed at about 9 months. It is significant that the word confidence means both skill in 
making acts as an independent self, and a sense of being in a trusting relationship to 
another self. (Trevarthen and Hubley, 1978, p. 226).  
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Within a couple of weeks, an infant gained a more serious interest in doing things together with 
her mother, taking particular interest in a companionÕs ideas about what to do with a selected 
object or to combine objects in a particular way, and to communicate ÔaboutÕ them. We called 
the new kind of sociability Ôsecondary intersubjectivityÕ or Ôcooperative awarenessÕ (Trevarthen 
and Hubley, 1978; Hubley and Trevarthen, 1979), wishing to relate it to  - but also differentiate 
it from - the primary direct person-to-person engagement that motivates the Ôprimary 
intersubjectivityÕ of proto-conversation with a two-month-old (Bateson, 1979; Trevarthen, 
1979). Piaget, in his study of the development of an individualÕs ÔthinkingÕ (Piaget, 1962) 
identified this change at 9 months as the beginning of the infantÕs Ôconcept of the objectÕ. He 
allows the infant no special awareness of persons who share intentions and feelings and may 
cooperate in the generation of meaning, which has been given special importance by 
researchers attentive to the development of language.  
Elizabeth Bates (1979) found 9 months to be the age when a child brings awareness of a person 
nearby into the consciousness of what the immediate world affords. Both the object of interest 
and the person who is present are alive in the imagination, and intentional communication 
about it begins, for example turning to ask for help to reach a wanted object, or looking back to 
the other to see if they are following an arm that is pointing to an attractive object or event. 
Scaife and Bruner (1975) had observed a change in readiness to follow anotherÕs direction of 
regard around 9 months. Tomasello (2008) identifies seeking for Ôjoint attentionÕ as The Origin 
of Human Communication. Again, it needs to be recognized that this change is not just a 
cognitive or practical appreciation of a context for action. The key change is a combining of 
attentions to objects with sympathy for the vocal and gestural expressions of companions 
(Reddy et al., 1997). The invitation to join comes from a new kind of social curiosity in the 
child (Esteve-Gibert, et al., 2016). 
A very important indication of the childÕs investment of purpose in a shared task, like the 
special form of delight shown in participation of a 6-month-old in a favourite game, is the 
expression of shared satisfaction or ÔprideÕ that is addressed to others for their admiration. This 
leads us to recognize that for a young child it is especially important and rewarding to share 
knowledge and skills with moral feelings of personal joy or distress (Trevarthen, 2005). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: A one-year-old shows her talents. 
A.     In the recording room, Basilie enjoys the comedy when her mother pretends to be sad. 
B., C. and D.  Mastering a task. She takes the wooden figure offered by her mother, with a 
request ÒPut the doll in the truckÓ. Basilie carefully puts it in the truck (C): then (D) looks 
with a self-satisfied expression at her mother who says, ÒWhat a clever girl!Ó 
E      At home Basilie and her mother read. Basilie is studying her book, the mother is intently 
occupied with a document, perhaps a telephone bill. 
F      Basilie drops her book and points to the motherÕs paper, with a critical vocal comment, 
ÔjargonÕ without words, but with intense prosody communicating criticism. This appears 
to be a response to the concerned expression of her mother. 
 
Infants and Toddlers as Personalities: Pride and Shame in Presentation of an Imaginative Self 
to Others. 
Draghi-Lorenz, Reddy and Costall (2001) insist on Ôre-thinking the development of 'non-basic' 
emotionsÕ, rejecting the theory that infants come with only a set of mindless reflex emotional 
responses to stimuli that cause bodily pleasure and pain, with social signaling of automatic 
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reactions of distress or anger.  Reddy (2008) has elaborated the richer approach demonstrating 
the developmental importance of complex ÔmoralÕ feelings of self-conscious shyness, pride and 
shame, which are sensitive to appreciation of the attentions and feelings of others (Figure 2.4, 
D). These are the Ôrelational affectsÕ identified by Stern (2000), regulating emotions of spiritual 
awareness that communicate the values of relationships (Hay, 2006). Emotions of the spirit are 
powerful in early childhood (Hay and Nye, 2006), and they are critically involved in the 
process of engagement in education from infancy (Trevarthen, 2005). Children learn with 
pride, and shame restricts understanding and learning.  
Our personality and our personal history depend on the recognition by others, including our 
parents and our teachers. Their attitude towards us is something we depend on as a source of 
affection and self-confidence. As Bruner says, in his celebration of our Ôstory-tellingÕ 
imagination, our narrative of life gives us our identity, and helps us learn. 
Why are we so intellectually dismissive towards narrative? É Storytelling performs the 
dual cultural functions of making the strange familiar and ourselves private and 
distinctive. If pupils are encouraged to think about the different outcomes that could have 
resulted from a set of circumstances, they are demonstrating usability of knowledge about 
a subject. Rather than just retaining knowledge and facts, they É use their imaginations 
to think about other outcomes. É This helps them to think about facing the future, and it 
stimulates the teacher too. (Bruner, 1996, pp. 39-40). 
 
Reforming Educational Practice for Early Years With the Evidence from Infancy  
 
ÒThe roots of all sciences and arts in every instance arise as early as in the tender age, 
and that on these foundations it is neither impossible nor difficult for the whole 
superstructure to be laid; provided always that we act reasonably as with a reasonable 
creature.Ó 
(John Amos Komensky (1592-1671), known as Comenius, in The School of Infancy. 
Quoted by Quick, 1910, pp. 144-145). 
 
Understanding that infants can communicate their intentions and feelings and want to share 
experiences confirms what experienced teachers of early years and affectionate parents know, 
that convivial play is the generator of learning from birth. Before a child is ready to accept 
formal instruction in language, literacy and numeracy they need to enjoy a free life in a safe 
and interesting environment shared with affectionate companions. 
This, of course, is not a new discovery. Comenius, the Moravian philosopher, pedagogue and 
theologian who wrote The School of the MotherÕs Breast (1628), School by Play (1630) and 
The Gate of Languages Unlocked (1631), and who is known as a creator of schools and as a 
teacher who elucidated the best principles for educating children from birth to the age of six, 
appreciated the infantÕs playful creativity and its contribution to human learning. In the 19
th
 
Century Robert Herbert Quick (1910) described Òa growing science of educationÓ intended to 
help teachers welcome the initiatives of all children to share discoveries in imaginative ways. 
He recorded the insights of the Jesuits of the 16
th
 Century, who criticized the restriction of 
teaching to book learning and said young children must exercise their bodies, and Rabelais who 
ridiculed the absurd idea of Ôpouring inÕ formulated knowledge. Following them, Pestalozzi and 
Froebel worked as teachers to reduce the misfortunes of young children obliged to work too 
soon at prescribed tasks, instead promoting their freedom to enjoy sociable learning at play in 
nature. 
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At the end of the 19
th
 Century James Mark Baldwin proposed that all life actively tests its 
awareness with Ôcircular reactionsÕ in which an initiative for action repeats itself to test 
stimulation, retaining the vitally good and pleasurable relations with the environment and 
suppressing bad and unpleasant stimulation. He inspired PiagetÕs theory of active learning and 
VygotskyÕs explanation of the social development of thought and language with the child as 
playful agent, and he opened the way to understanding how Ôself-imitationÕ leads to reciprocal 
imitation with others as the key motive of communication (Nadel, 2014). But BaldwinÕs 
understanding was rejected by the reductive psychology of behaviourism, and it gained 
recognition in his time only in the writings of philosophers, including Bergson, James, and 
Dewey. 
In the 1920s Alfred North Whitehead, argued for appreciation of the first ÔromanticÕ stage of 
the educational experience, and retention of its creative energy through to study at the 
University. He observed that in school childish imagination is transformed into the stage of 
ÔprecisionÕ which concerns Ôexactness of formulationÕ. In resistance to this limitation, 
Whitehead helped Susan Langer develop a philosophy of art in movement, presented as 
Philosophy in a New Key (Langer, 1942). 
Jean Piaget (1951, 1962) described the infant mind as ÔegocentricÕ. He failed to notice that 
attractive expressions by eyes, face, voice and hands show more than Òpleasure in masteryÓ of a 
practical task, and did not appreciate that Ôcircular reactionsÕ are, as Baldwin showed, readily 
shared with teachers, if they are not too preoccupied with reason and unreceptive to playful 
invention. 
Jerome Bruner, who already in the 1940s insisted on the importance of a childÕs purposes and 
feelings for learning, expanded his philosophy of education in a new way by leading work in 
the Center for Cognitive Studies at Harvard to study the convivial enjoyment of intentions and 
problem solving by infants (Bruner, 1968). Margaret Donaldson (1963, 1978), also showed that 
three and four-year-old children appreciate other personsÕ points of view to experience a world 
shared purposefully and with emotional evaluation. They enjoy playing with differences of 
belief, as long as they do not receive imperative correction. 
The foundations of education, in every culture, are in the development from birth of human 
motives to test and expand active experience, and to share it with companions, Ôstory-tellingÕ 
for fun (Bruner, 1996; Trevarthen, Gratier and Osborne, 2014), with emotions of Ôhuman senseÕ 
(Donaldson, 1978). To understand how we can best support the growth of this curiosity and 
sociability in infants and toddlers, we can learn from researchers in the arts, especially music. 
This is the belief of Loris Malaguzzi of Reggio Emilia in Italy, who insists on giving the 
"hundred languages" of childhood in play with all sorts of media the freedom to discover how 
they may be used in skills of everyday life. ÒThe program is based on the principles of respect, 
responsibility, and community through exploration and discovery in a supportive and enriching 
environment based on the interests of the children through a self-guided curriculum.Ó 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ReggioEmiliaapproach).  That is how childish enthusiasm 
motivates the learning of conventional practices and beliefs to supporting the traditions and 
inventions of a culture (Rogoff, 2003). 
The views of Pestalozzi and Froebel inspired in turn the views and practices of Maria 
Montessori (1897-1952) and Jerome Bruner (b. 1915, and still teaching), which follow 
Comenius in their efforts to reduce misfortunes of young children and promote their enjoyment 
of learning (Trevarthen and Bj¿rkvold, 2016). 
These different approaches have led to an acceptance by developmental psychology of the rich 
imaginative consciousness or Ôspirit for life in movementÕ of a newborn, and appreciation of 
their special human abilities for communicating ÔconsciousnessÕ as intentions to know with 
feelings of curiosity and enjoyment, both defined differently from verbal thoughts or rational 
explanations that may be developed later to describe ÔcognitionÕ of a material causal world. 
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There have been great pioneers of this sense of being a human being with a human mind that 
lacks words and cognitions abstracted from active motor use. Their advice must guide 
educators in modern Western cultures. 
 
Modern Prescriptions for Accepting Natural Impulses for Learning 
 
Early childhood is Ò...a period of momentous significance for all people growing up 
in [our] culture... By the time this period is over, children will have formed 
conceptions of themselves as social beings, as thinkers, and as language users, and 
they will have reached certain important decisions about their own abilities and their 
own worth.Ó 
(Donaldson, Grieve and Pratt, 1983, p. 1.  Quoted to introduce New ZealandÕs early 
childhood curriculum Te Whariki, 1996) 
 
This quotation from Donaldson, Grieve and Pratt (1983) supports the understanding of the role 
of childhood in transmission of culture that has guided the  New Zealand formulation of Te 
Whāriki an inspiring bicultural ECEC curriculum that is inclusive of under three-year-olds (Te 
Whāriki, 1996) 
Indigenous views concerning the natural talents of the very young child (Nuttall, 2013; White 
and Mika, 2013) demonstrate respect for what Margaret Donaldson (1978) calls Ôhuman senseÕ, 
common to all cultures, and her recognition that the normal development to a meaningful life 
for a self-consciousness personality needs oral and practical transmission of culture-specific 
Ôcommon senseÕ in intersubjective encounters.  Donaldson insists that a balance is required 
between acceptance of the natural eagerness of the child to learn in companionship, and the 
need for guidance in disciplined methods of learning by instruction from teachers in a planned 
education (Donaldson, 1992, pp. 245-266).  
In Scotland, we are fortunate to have these principles adopted into the Curriculum for 
Excellence (Education Scotland, 2009) as principles of education that celebrate the childÕs 
agency and well-being made in intersubjective engagement with teachers and professional 
caregivers as a priority for professional practice. This commitment is evidenced in child-
centred pedagogies that attend to the affective nature of the child to work with his or her 
intentions in creative, imaginative projects that can be achieved, developing confidence in a 
secure and responsible companionship.  The non-verbal nature of intersubjective relations, 
building narratives of meaning with patterned autonomic arousal and shared affect become 
cornerstones of a sensitive pedagogy that can capture the imagination and interest of children, 
even those with so-called behavioural difficulties, to help them to discover and find interest in 
learning (Delafield-Butt and Adie, 2015; 2016).  Such pedagogies, seek to support every childÕs 
interests and capacities to nurture and bring out the best in that child, and have sensitivity for 
whatever social or emotional difficulties they may have (Gunn and Delafield-Butt, 2016). 
Every childÕs learning is by nature affective and purposeful, never just cognitive Ð and it is 
adapted to come to life in intimate and playful companionship.  This is a fundamental principle 
for an effective educational pedagogy, and is no less true for the education of infants, who are 
beginning to be inquisitive about arbitrary knowledge and skills. 
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